Yemen has turned into a very problematic and confusing Middle Eastern entity with multiple open political* socio-ecological* economic and security battlefields. On the political front* the expected peaceful spring between the opposition and the government* following their agreement to postpone the parliamentarian elections to the year 2011 has quickly turned into a boiling summer. On the socio-ecological and economic fronts* Yemen?s national economy is taking a deep dive* unemployment is swelling* natural resources are depilating* infrastructure is falling apart* and there is a growing collective perception in the streets of Sana?a that time is pregnant with the expectation of a major disaster. On the security front* on the other hand* the cards have become completely mixed. Yemen faces security issues concerning Al-Qaeda* the Huthis* the Southern uprising* inter-tribal conflicts* trafficking of people* smuggling* and piracy in the Gulf of Aden. One of the recent concrete examples that illustrates the current confusing mixture is the announcement that the influential tribal leader* Sheikh Tareq Al-Fadhli* who fought with Osama Bin Laden and Hekmatyar in Afghanistan* and supported President Ali Abdullah Saleh?s government in the 1994 war against the former Southern regime* is allying himself with the Southern movement against Sanaa?s central government.In the light of this dangerous confusion* the pressure on Yemen?s central government and regional and international stakeholders to act is increasing on daily basis. But it would be reckless for stakeholders to engage deeply with Yemen?s complex problems without first considering the possible pitfalls that past experiences might reveal. In other words* there is an urgent need for sorting out Yemen?s problems* not summing them up* under the guidance of one main question: What went wrong in post-unification Yemen? Observers of Yemen who use a telescopic analytical view would agree with me that the root causes of what went wrong in the recent political history of Yemen are to be found in the long neglect of Yemen?s political elites* regional powers* and international cooperation community to the security-development nexus. Through the prism of such a nexus* no security can be achieved without development* and no development can be achieved without security. Disharmonizing and harmonizing the relationship between security and development* however* cannot be achieved by hermetically sealed individual countries. As in the case of Yemen* regional and international stakeholders had a major role to play in the deliberate bifurcation of development and security policies. For instance* United States? policy towards Yemen has been driven* for decades* purely by security concerns like the Cold War* the security of oil supply from the Gulf region* and lately by the ?war on terror.? The dimension of economic and human development in Yemen has been little recognized also by regional powers. Concrete examples here are the refusal of Yemen?s bid to join the GCC* and the expulsion* in the aftermath of Saddam?s invasion of Kuwait* of hundreds of thousands of Yemenis working in oil rich neighboring countries. In short* the current multifaceted violence in Yemen not only harms development efforts for Yemen* but also it is the consequence of the failure of economic and human development in the southwestern corner of Arabia. Clearly* there is an urgent need to strive for greater coherence between security and development policies in Yemen. Both policies must be mutually supportive.Linking security and development should be* therefore* a policy mantra. In the light of the current escalating violence* the acute socio-political instability and dark future scenarios in Yemen* it is mindless delusion from regional and international powers to expect that Yemen?s central government will be able* alone* to come out of the tunnel* and to invest more in its social and economic future. It is true that foreign aid cannot make up for incompetently run national economy* and it cannot compensate for misallocated national resources or distortions created by corruption and cronyism. However* in dealing with the explosive Yemeni context* which contains a very harmful spill over effect* the goal of the international community should be supporting Yemen?s central government in order to shorten the long waiting time for the benefits of sustainable development strategies. Time is running out for Yemen. On the basis of the inescapable logic that dealing with the consequences of state failure is far more expensive for regional and international actors than striking a balance between security and development* the following measure should be taken by national* regional and international stakeholders: The reordering of Yemen?s social and economic priorities- with a focus on establishing tighter controls on corruption* and on effective reforming of taxation system. This measure is essential to generate a stream of financial resources for human and economic development. Secondly* serious joint economic projects in the fields of tourism* agriculture* fishery* mining and manufacturing* must be launched. Financial resources for these projects will need to come from governments and private investors in the GCC countries. Benefits of these projects* however* should be directed towards local development* and not be allowed to flow in a disproportional manner to a small group of businessmen. Third* a coordinated joint effort in international development assistance to Yemen must be implemented. In this respect* I suggest the establishment of a UN-EU sponsored fund for the prevention of state failure in Yemen. Fourth* the GCC and the Arab League should join hands in diffusing Yemen?s domestic conflicts with the Huthi rebels and the southern movement. Such diffusion* along with economic relief* will provide Yemen?s central government with more resources to focus on dealing with militant fundamentalism. The latter made realpolitik dominate the development scene. Khaled Fattah is an academic researcher and political analyst. He can be reached at KF62@st-andrews.ac.uk...

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